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This is a study of the relationship across the Taiwan Strait. The relationship between 
the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (PRC) on 
Mainland China is not only important to the two governments, but also is important to the 
world community. After an overview of the historical background and the political policy 
development of each side toward each other, this thesis points out the ROC and the PRC's 
current strat~:~i~:s in terms of their cross-Strait relation. Further, it examines four factors in 
the future de\ c h lpment of their cross-Strait relationship; namely international politics, the 
PRC's stahilit~. the ROC's public opinionofTaiwanindependence,and interactions between 
both sides. Finally, the author provides conclusions and recommendations on how to 
improve the future relationship between the PRC and the ROC. The four primary 
recommendations are: adopting a concept of "soft sovereignty", implementing more 
pragmatic consultations, increasing exchanges, and creating mutual trust. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The division of China into two separate governments is a great misfortune for all 
Chinese people. Many countries throughout history have experienced periods of division 
and reunification, and the history of China is also one of periodic partition and unity. 
Modem Chinese have been unable to escape this kind of historical cycle. Since 1949, when 
the Chinese Communists established the People's Republic of China in Beijing and the 
Nationalist Government transferred to Taipei, the Chinese people on both sides of the 
Taiwan Strait have lived in two societies with different ideologies and political systems, as 
well as different economic and social systems. [Ref. 1, p. 54-55] 
In examining recent Chinese history, it is clear that the relationship between Taiwan 
and Mainland China is quite different from the former two Germanies, the two Vietnams, 
and the current two Koreas in four main ways. First of all, Mainland China and Taiwan are 
different from these other situations in that rather than being separated through international 
agreements, they were separated as the result of civil war. Secondly, unlike these other 
countries which share a common boundary, Mainland China and Taiwan are separated by 
the Taiwan Strait. Thirdly, whereas the former two Germanies and Vietnams as well as the 
present two Koreas were and are divided nearly equally, the geographical areas of Mainland 
China and Taiwan are quite different in size. Lastly, whereas the other countries were and 
are recognized by each other, the governments of the People's Republic of China and the 
Republic of China have never officially recognized each other. [Ref. 2, pp. 345-371] 
Recently both the PRC and the ROC have indicated that they desire unification. On 
June 26, 1983 Deng Xiaoping proposed the idea of having ""one country but two systems. 
[Ref. 3, p. 206] In fact, the PRC continues to espouse this idea. However, the Executive 
Branch of the ROC states very strongly that "Only unification under a free and democratic 
system will give the Chinese people happiness and enable China to make a greater 
contribution to world peace, security, and prosperity." [Ref. 1, p. 56] 
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The hope of both the PRC and the ROC is to resolve the issue of reunification 
peacefully. Ironically, the PRC refuses to give up the possible use of military force to 
reunify China. For example, in March of 1996, the PRC used military missile exercises near 
Taiwan in order to try to influence Taiwan's presidential election. At the same time, 
Taiwan's hope is to become a member of the United Nations in order to safeguard its 
democratic system. 
In order to resolve this conflict peacefully, both the PRC and the ROC will need to 
focus not only on their differences; but rather on the cultural, economic, educational, and 
even political contributions they can each make to the other and their possible future of better 
relationship. 
A. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between the PRC and the 
ROC. The relationship between the two governments of China is not only important to the 
two governments, but is important to the world community. This relationship derives its 
importance from the economic prowess of the Republic of China and the rapidly growing 
economic engine of The People's Republic of China. If the relationship between the two 
governments improves, the prospects for a peaceful and prosperous Asian-Pacific Region are 
assured. Ifthe relationship declines, the People's Republic of China as an up and coming 
superpower will find itself eventually in conflict with the Republic of China and possibly 
with most of the world's powers. 
B. SCOPE OF THESIS 
This study is limited to political policies and the statements of recent leaders of each 
of the two governments. Other countries' policies will be addressed when they have a direct 
effect on the stated policies of the ROC or the PRC. This study will not address the military 
capabilities of the two governments except as it reflects each government's policies. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
The primary research question is "How can the relationship between the two 
governments be improved?" To address this issue the following questions must be 
considered: 
1. What is the current relationship? 
2. What are the factors that affect the improvement of relations? 
3. What are the political lines that each government has drawn? 
4. What is the overall political strategy of The People's Republic of China? 
5. What is the overall political strategy ofthe Republic of China? 
To address the primary research question, it will be necessary to examine the PRC and 
ROC's policies for conflict and commonalties. This will be done by surveying the official 
positions of each government and the statements of world political leaders and researchers. 
Each government's policies will be examined in the light of both the official stated position 
and actions in recent years. To address the primary research question, it is necessary to 
examine in detail the current relationship between the two governments. The primary 
research method for this will be an examination of reputable news reports and articles from 
such publications as The Economist, The Free China Journal, Beijing Review; Far Eastern 
Economic Review, etc. 
To determine the factors which would improve the relationship between the ROC and 
the PRC, the conflicts and common positions of each government will be examined. This 
again, will be determined from reputable news reports of each government's actions and the 
official position. At times both the ROC and the PRC have stated positions for which there 
is no compromise. These statements will be examined for their practical effect on the 
relationship between the two governments. To give the reader a sense of the direction of each 
3 
government's policy, the study will conduct an analysis of the overall political strategy 
employed by each government. This section will include a brief history of the relationship. 
The author will endeavor to fit these strategies into the current theory/research literature on 
political and economic relationships between governments. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This chapter has been a brief introduction to the relationship between the PRC and the 
ROC. Chapter II examines the recent history of the PRC and ROC. Chapter III examines the 
statements of each of the governments to determine where the political lines are drawn in 
their relationship. Chapter IV identifies current political strategies of the PRC and the ROC 
toward each other. Chapter V examines factors in the future development of the cross-Strait 
relationship which will be the keys to improve the relationship between both sides. In 
Chapter VI the author will present conclusions and recommendations. 
E. FLOW CHART OF THE THESIS 
In order to explicate the configuration of the thesis, the author provided a flow chart 
of his thesis. (see Figure 1.) The flow chart shows each chapter's title, relevant sources and 















current theory/research literature 
on political and economic issues; 
newspapers and periodicals 
CH. 3 
Political Lines Each Government 
Drawn 
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leaders speeches; 
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CH. 5 
Factors in the Future Development 
of the Cross-Strait Relationship 
1. International politics 
2. The PRC's stability 
3. The ROC's public opinion of Taiwan independence 




1. Adopting a concept of "soft sovereignty" 
2. Implementing more pragmatic consultations 
3. Increasing exchanges 
4. Creating mutual trust 
Figure 1. Flow Chart of the Thesis 
5 
6 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
There is no doubt that the history of Taiwan is intimately linked with the history of 
Mainland China. This chapter attempts to address recent Chinese history across the Strait 
from the late nineteenth century to the present. By surveying this recent history, one can 
more easily identify changes in the development of the relationship between the PRC and 
the ROC. Specifically, this chapter will deal with the most significant events which have 
contributed to this changing relationship and will only touch on the period after 1894. 
A. BEFORE 1945 
Historically, Taiwan has been separated from Mainland China for more than one 
hundred years except for the period from 1945 to 1949 after the surrender of Japan and the 
restoration of Taiwan by the Nationalist Government. 
1. Taiwan Ceded to Japan 
Taiwan is populated almost entirely by people who are ethnically, linguistically and 
culturally Chinese. Although Taiwan had been a Chinese territory for centuries, the Imperial 
Chinese Government did not pay a great deal of attention to its affairs until the latter part of 
the nineteenth century when efforts by Japan and then France to take the island by force led 
China to appreciate the importance of Taiwan to China's national defense. As part of a series 
of government reforms on the island, Taiwan become a regular province of China in the late 
Ching Dynasty.[Ref. 4, p.79] 
In 1894, China (under the Ching Dynasty) and Japan went to war--a war which China 
promptly lost. Under the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki, China ceded Taiwan and the Penghu 
Islands to Japan. Due to China's defeat, Dr. Sun Yat-sen and his followers began to follow 
a revolutionary path rather than peaceful reform. The clearest evidence of this dramatic turn 
to revolution was the founding of the Hsin-Chung Hui (the China Revival Society) in 
November of 1894 by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. This event also marked the beginning ofthe Chinese 
Nationalist Revolution. 
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Between 1900 and 1918, Dr. Sun went to Taiwan three times. As a result, many 
Taiwanese had become Sun's followers, and they also joined in many of the revolutionary 
uprisings against the Ching Dynasty. 
In October, 1911, after at least ten attempts of revolutionary operations, Dr. Sun and 
his followers overthrew the Ching Dynasty and established the Republic of China with 
himself as the first President of the Republic. Dr. Sun Yat-sen died in 1925. Soon after 
Sun's death, Chiang Kai-shek succeeded him to be the leader of the Chinese. However, 
during this time since 1911, Taiwan was still occupied by the Japanese until1945. [Ref. 5, 
pp. 7-33] 
2. Taiwan Returned to China 
In 1937, Japan started an all-out War of Aggression against China. As a result, at the 
April1 , 193 8 meeting of the Provisional National Congress, Chiang Kai-shek announced the 
determination of theN ationalist Governmentto recover Taiwan after the war. Foil owing this 
action, on December 9, 1941, the Nationalist Government formally declared war against 
Japan and abolished all treaties between China and Japan including the 1895 Treaty of 
Shimonoseki. 
In November of 1943, President Chiang Kai-shek met with President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt of the United States and Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great Britain at a 
wartime summit conference in Cairo, Egypt. On December 1, 1943, these three world 
leaders released a communique, later known as the Cairo Declaration, signed on November 
26, which stated that "[it] is their purpose ... that all the territories Japan has stolen from the 
Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic 
of China." It was the Potsdam Proclamation of July 26, 1945 that declared that "the terms 
ofthe Cairo Declaration shall be carried out." [Ref.4, p.79] 
In fact, the Japanese Instrument of Surrender accepted the terms of the Potsdam 
Declaration, and Japanese forces on Taiwan carried out instructions to surrender to the 
Chinese army on September 2, 1945. Finally, on October 25, 1945, Taiwan was formally 
restored to the Republic of China and has been under its administration since that time. 
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B. THE CIVIL WARS: 1931-1936 AND 1946-1949 
The Civil War is a critical period in recent Chinese history across the Strait. Since the 
result of the second civil war which was between the Nationalists and the Communists, 
Taiwan and Mainland China have been separated again for some 47 years. 
1. 1931-1936 
The Chinese Communist Party was founded in Shanghai in 1921 with Soviet 
Communist support. By 1928 General Chiang Kai-shekhad managed to bring most of China 
under Nationalist control, but the seeds of the Communist Party of China had also taken root. 
The Chinese Communists rebelled against the National Government and established a 
provisional "Soviet Government" in Chianghsi on November 7, 1931. 
As long as the Chinese Communist Party established the "Soviet Government", 
drawing up a "constitution" and organizing a "provisional central government", Chiang 
Kai-shek announced that the Chinese Communist Party was an illegal organization and 
attacked the Communist's troops. Campaigns against the communists led to the famous Long 
March from 1934 to 1935.[Ref.7, p.92] 
2. 1937-1945 
From 1937 to 1945, the Nationalists and the Communists cooperated to some degree 
against the Japanese occupation of the mainland. During the war against Japan, the 
Communist adopted a strategy to expand the Communist organization. Mao, the chairman 
of Chinese Communist Party said "we should use ten percent of our strength to oppose 
Japan; twenty percent to appeasing the National Government; and seventy percent to 
developing our own power." [Ref. 6, p. 79] Therefore this strategy made the Communist 
Party much stronger and, as a result, the Communist Party became more influential in rural 
and urban areas. 
3. 1945-1949 
Foil owing the War against Japan, the two sides resumed their struggle for supremacy, 
despite efforts by the United States to bring the factions together in a negotiated settlement. 
During the period from 1945 to 1949, Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung struggled for 
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supremacy in Mainland China. By late 1949, the Nationalists had been defeated, and 
Chiang Kai-shek withdrew to the island of Taiwan with approximately 1.2 million members 
of his government and military. 
Meanwhile, in Taiwan, a tragic event occurred in 194 7. The Taiwanese, who had lived 
on the island before 1945, at first welcomed the Nationalists as liberators. Within a short 
time, however, the exploitative actions of the Nationalists soldiers who arrived in 1945 
alienated the Taiwanese. Severe riots occurred on February 28, 1947, and thousands of 
people were killed including native Taiwanese and mainlanders who had just moved to 
Taiwan after the restoration. When President Chiang Kai-shek became aware of the situation, 
he punished those responsible and instituted policies designed to improve the life of the 
Taiwanese. Although friction between the mainlanders and the Taiwanese remains an 
underlying political and social problem, it has abated with time and through the efforts of 
both groups to work out their differences.[Ref.7, p.92] 
C. FROM 1949 TO THE PRESENT 
On October 1, 1949, Mao Tse-tung established the People's Republic of China in 
Beijing. Shortly after that, Chiang Kai-shek moved the Nationalist Government to Taipei. 
During the period between 1949 and the 1970's, the PRC attempted to liberate Taiwan 
several times. However, the Taiwan Strait, during this time, was an impedimentto the PRC's 
army which could not easily cross the Strait. Likewise, the ROC's army could not effectively 
cross the Strait to attack the Mainland. From the 1960's on, the PRC gradually changed its 
policies toward Taiwan. Instead, they emphasized peaceful reunification rather than war. 
Beginning in 1981, Taiwan has also given up the use of its military power to recover 
Mainland China and are now using the appeal of political propaganda such as emphasizing 
the benefits of The Three Principles of the People instead of Communism to peacefully 
reunify both.[Ref. 1, p.25] 
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1. Taiwan Strait Crises 
In the spring of 1950, the PRC began massing forces to invade Taiwan. What 
apparently saved the ROC from an invasion was the Soviet Union's inspired North Korean 
attack on South Korea, which occurred on June 25. The invasion led to a revision of 
U.S.-Asiandefensepoliciesto include Taiwan. U.S. President, President Truman, stated on 
June 2 7, that in view ofN orth Korea's action, "the occupation of Taiwan by the PRC forces 
would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to the United States forces." 
He ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet be deployed to this area of the Pacific in order to prevent 
any Communist attack on Taiwan from happening. 
During the summer of 1954, the PRC stepped up military pressure on Kinmen, Matsu, 
!-Chiang and Tachen islands in retaliation for the negotiation of the U.S.-sponsored 
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, signed in Manila on September 8. Those islands 
are close to the mainland but controlled by the ROC. On Jan. 18, 1955, PRC invaded the 
offshore island of !-Chiang, 210 miles north of Taiwan and launched a massive 
bombardment of the Tachen islands, eight miles south of !-Chiang. Although the U.S. 
Senate had approvedratificationofthe "U.S.-RepublicofChina Mutual Defense Treaty" on 
February 9, the islands ofl-Chiang and Tachen were later taken over by the PRC. 
On August 23, 1958, the PRC resumed military operations against the remaining 
ROC-held offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu concentrating heavy artillery barrages 
againstKinmen. On October 20, U.S. Secretary Dulles flew to Taiwan for talks with Chiang. 
A joint statement by President Chiang and Secretary of State Dulles issued on October 23 
stated that under present conditions, the defense of the Kinmen islands together with the 
Matsu islands is closely related to the defense of Taiwan and the Penghu islands. Dulles, in 
a film interview released by the State Department on October23, said the United States "was 
not going to attack or tolerate attacks against the PRC," but that the U.S. government would 
"stand firm" to resist any further attacks by the PRC. During Dulles's stay in Taiwan, he 
reportedly persuaded Chiang to reduce his forces deployed on the offshore islands by 
one-third. After the ROC cut back their forces on the islands, the PRC soon scaled down 
their artillery bombardments to an every-other-day affair of no military significance. Since 
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1959, there has been little tension m the Taiwan Strait, and the PRC has ceased 
bombardment of the offshore islands. In the 1960's, the U.S. Seventh Fleet's presence in the 
Taiwan Strait was reduced to a two-destroyer patrol which was tenninated in the late 
1960's.[Ref.4, pp.27-29] 
2. The Taiwan Independence Movement 
The Taiwan Independence Movement has a fairly long history which began as early 
as the Japanese colonial era. However, this movement gained more support as the result of 
four major C\'cnts. The first event was the February 28, 1947 tragedy when thousands of 
Taiwanese were killed and imprisoned. The second factor which helped the movement to 
gain momentum was the fact that during the 1950's and 1960's, most of the political power 
was controlkd hy a disproportionate number of mainlanders (the Nationalist Government 
officials and m iIi tary ). The third factor was the ousting of the ROC from the United Nations 
in October. 1971 and its replacement by the PRC. The last major factor was the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the People's Republic 
of China on December 16, 1978 and the severing of the diplomatic relations between the 
United States and the ROC. Also, one year later, the fonner U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense 
Treaty was voided instead ofThe Taiwan Relations Act.[Ref.4, pp.30-31] 
About the Taiwan independence issues, the PRC former Premier Chou En-lai made the 
following statement on July 28, 1971, in remarks to a visiting group of American graduate 
students in Beijing: "We are absolutely opposed to the so-called Taiwan Independence 
Movement because the people in Taiwan are Chinese .... the Taiwan Independence Movement 
is not a native movement in itself. It is a special movement which has behind it the special 
manipulation form foreign forces. One of their leaders is Peng Ming-min, who was 
originally a student at Harvard, then went back to Taiwan to become a professor and now is 
also back in the United States. There are also some elements of them in Japan. They are 
supported by the Japanese government." [Ref.4, p.32] 
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3. Another Crisis Across the Strait 
During the period from the 1960's to the early 1990's, the Strait experienced an 
unprecedented period of peace. Although the PRC reiterated that it would never give up the 
possible use of military forces to attack Taiwan, it didn't create any aggressive action in the 
Strait during this period. Meanwhile, in spite of the interview on CBS television in April, 
1971, President Chiang emphasized "I have full confidence that the Chinese mainland shall 
and will be recovered. My confidence has never wavered a bit.",[Ref.4, p. 31] his son, 
Chiang Ching-kuo, succeed the presidency in 1978, gradually changed the ROC's policies 
toward the PRC. 
In November 1987, the ROC government allowed people to visit their relatives in 
Mainland China, in turn, loosened the limitation of traveling and investing in Mainland 
China. On January 13, 1988, President Chiang Ching-kuo passed away, the Vice President 
Lee Teng-hui succeed the presidency. 
In April of 1993, the "Koo-Wang Talks" was held in Singapore. It was the fist contact 
between the heads of two private government-authorized intermediary organizations in more 
than four decades since China was divided and placed under separate rule. Although there 
was no concrete agreement reached after five regular talks on practical issues, a foundation 
for future cross-Strait talks was laid. 
The improvingsituationchangeddramaticallyon July211995, when the first oftwo 
PRC missile exercises commenced ninety-five miles north of Taiwan (see Figure 1 ). This 
was because on June 8 1995, The Clinton administration granted a U.S. visa to the President 
Lee Teng-hui to visit Cornell University. The PRC was convinced that Lee is pursuing 
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Figure 2. Missile Target Sites in Taiwan Strait 
On August 15 and November 15, 1995 the PRC held two difference types of military 
exercises in the sea close to the northern Taiwan. On March 8 1996, with the historic popular 
election of the ROC president barely two weeks away, the PRC announced it would begin 
test-frringmissiles into target areas in the sea close to Taiwan's two biggest ports, Keelung 
and Kaohsiung (see Figure 2). Meanwhile, in an official statement, the ROC Premier Lien, 
Chan condemned the missile-firing plan, which Beijing said would run from March 8 to 
March 15. 
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Figure 3. Military Maneuver Areas of the PRC 
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Tensions in the Taiwan Strait continued to mount during the following week prior to 
March 23 presidential election neared and the PRC initiated a new round of military 
maneuvers. Beijing escalated its intimidation of Taiwan on March 12, when it began nine 
days of live-ammunition military exercises in the waters southwest of Taiwan. The 
maneuvers were scheduled to conclude on March 20.[Ref.8, p.1] 
Due to the dangerous military games held by the PRC, President Clinton announced 
it was deploying two aircraft carrier battle groups, the Independence and the Nimitz near 
Taiwan (see Figure 3) according to the Taiwan Relations Act. Although the PRC reiterated 
that anything between Taiwan and Mainland China is an internal matter, it never allowed 
any foreign power interfere with it. Fortunately, the PRC maneuvers concluded peacefully 
and President Lee was reelected as the 9th president of the ROC on March 23 1996, with 
54% of the votes.[Ref.8, p.2] 
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Figure 4. U.S. Deployed Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups in March 1996 
D. SUMMARY 
Obviously, the modem history of China is a record of the Chinese people suffering 
aggression, dismemberment and calamity because of different ideologies as well as different 
foreign powers involvement. Based upon the historical background, it is clear that there still 
remain considerable differences between Taiwan and mainland China due to their nearly one 
hundred years of separation. 
The next step in the analysis of the future relationship across the Taiwan Strait will 
focus the examination on various political statements made by both the ROC and the PRC 
in order to determine where their lines are drawn at present and where they may converge 
or diverge in the future. 
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III. POLITICAL LINES EACH GOVERNMENT HAS DRAWN 
For most of the past some 47 years, both sides of the Taiwan strait were diametrically 
opposed and deeply hostile to each other, and for that reason, they had almost no contact. 
There was no such thing as 'cross-Strait relations." However, since the beginning of 1990's, 
both sides have gradually changed their political policies. This chapter will examine the 
political lines that both sides have drawn. 
A. ROC'S POLITICAL POLICY DEVELOPMENT TOWARD THE PRC 
Durin~ thr.: past 47 years, the ROC has had four different policies towards the PRC. 
First, in Chiang Kai-shek's era, "recovering the Chinese Mainland" was emphasized. 
Second. durin~ the Chiang Ching-kuo's era, addressing "reunification of China under the 
Three Princrplc.\ of the People" and the "three no's" was stressed. Third, throughout the Lee 
Teng-hui's era. Lee adopted "Guidelines for National Unification" and recently, in Lee's 
Inaugural Address in 1996, Lee suggested that he may visit Mainland China to improve the 
cross-Strait relations. 
This portion will only deal with the developmentofPresidentChiang Ching-kuo'sand 
Lee Teng-hui's cross-Strait policies. 
1. The Chiang Ching-kuo Era 
During the KMT' s (Kuomintang, the ruling party of the ROC) 12th National Congress 
held in 1981, the KMT resolved to seek "Reunification of China under the Three Principles 
of the People." [Ref. 1, p. 25] The party claimed that the only way to unify China was to 
implement the Three Principles of the People throughout the entire country. 
During this period, these calls for unification became the central theme of the Republic 
of China's mainland policy. In other words, the dispute between the two sides of the Strait 
hinged on whether a free and democratic China or a China under communist dictatorship best 
fulfilled the aspirations of the Chinese people and served the interests of the world as a 
whole. The ROC government's chief reason for advocating "unification under the Three 
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Principles of the People" was that the practice of these two contrasting systems over the past 
three decades or more, both on the two sides of the Strait and in the world at large, had 
resulted in the utter defeat of Marxism-Leninism, while the Three Principles of the People 
had proved better suited to the conditions of China and, therefore, was better able to solve 
the "China problem." Political movements launched under the communist system, such as 
land reform, the "hundred flowers," the "three red banners," and the Cultural Revolution had 
cost the Chinese people dearly, and even the CCP itself was now describing them as 
"catastrophes." In Taiwan, however, the ROC government had implemented Sun Yatsen's 
Three Principles of the People and had promoted economic development and political reform 
in a moderate and gradual manner, creating prosperity and democracy on a scale 
unprecedented in Chinese history. [Ref. 1, pp. 26-27] Therefore, the Three Principles of the 
People should be emphasized. 
The late President Chiang Ching-kuo, then also chairman of the ruling party (KMT), 
supplemented his strategy toward the mainland regime with a "three no's" policy of "no 
contact, no negotiations, and no compromise" to further demonstrate the ROC's 
determination to oppose communism. [Ref. 9, p. 198] 
The new situation created by contact with the PRC was best summarized in the 
inaugural address in 1984 by President Chiang Ching-kuo in which he stated: "Times are 
changing, trends are changing, and the environment is also changing." [Ref. 10, p. 205] A 
ROC's cross-Strait relation white paper report summarizes this change as follows: 
On November2, 1987, President Chiang Ching-kuo,inspired by traditional 
moral principles and humanitarian considerations, allowed Taiwan residents to 
visit their relatives on the mainland, ending nearly four decades of estrangeme:rt 
and marking a turning-point in relations between the two sides of the Taiwan 
Strait. From this time on, cross-Strait relations progressed from a state of 
complete estrangement toward people-to-people exchanges. [Ref. 1, p. 27] 
In other words, even formerly fixed policies have become more flexible since this 
phase. 
18 
2. The Lee Teng-hui Era 
a. The "Guidelines for National Unification" 
In October 1990, President Lee invited individuals from the ruling, opposition 
parties and other figures outside of politics to sit on a National Unification Council. This 
council was charged with drawing up the "Guidelines for National Unification" which would 
define the goals for different phases of the ROC's future Mainland China policy. This new 
policy constitutes a long range blueprint for national unification. [Ref. 1, p. 28] 
The Guidelines state that unification should be achieved in three phases: 
• Short-term phase of exchanges and reciprocity. 
• Medium-term phase of mutual trust and cooperation. 
• Long-term phase of consultation and unification. 
The phased approach was chosen with full realization that the eventual unification of both 
sides is a long and arduous political process. Because the two sides have divergent social, 
political, and economic systems, not to mention vastly different lifestyles, China's 
unification will not be achieved overnight. However, there is no fixed time-frame for each 
stage. Progress may be slow or fast, depending on the pace with which the Chinese 
communists respond to the ideas outlined in the Guidelines. 
Currently, the relations are in the short-term phase. During this stage, it is hoped 
that neither side will deny the other's existence as a political entity; and that both sides will 
continue expand non-official people-to-people contacts. It is also hoped that the PRC 
authorities will renounce the use of force against Taiwan, and allow Taiwan enough room 
to maneuver in the world community. Unfortunately, the PRC has so far not reacted 
favorably to these proposals. 
The first task in the medium-term phase is to set up channels of official 
communications between the two sides on the basis of parity. The goals of this second~term 
phase include also the establishment of direct postal, transportation, and commercial links 
across the Taiwan Strait. Then, ranking officials of both sides can exchange visits. Only after 
the goals of this phase have been achieved can the process of national unification be brought 
into the picture. 
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In the long-term phase, a bilateral consultative body could be established with a 
function to "jointly discuss the grand political and economic structure of a unified China, in 
accordance with the wishes of the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait." A China that 
achieves peaceful, democratic unification and prosperous growth will have a substantial 
stabilizing impact on the Asia-Pacific region in particular and on world peace in general. 
[Ref. 11, p. 109] 
b. Lee's 1990 Inaugural Address 
President Lee Teng-hui, in his inaugural address on May 20, 1990, announced 
that Taipei would be willing to establish channels of communication and open up academic, 
cultural, trade, scientific, and technological exchanges with the mainland under the following 
conditions: ( 1) Beijing must implement political democracy and a free economic system; (2) 
renounce the use of force against Taiwan; and (3) not interfere with the ROC's development 
of foreign relations on the basis of a one-China policy. 
President Lee's ground-breaking proposals appeared to mean that Taiwan was 
ready to break their "three-no's" policy towards mainland China. 
A few days later, however, Beijing's official Xin Hua (New China) News 
Agency, in a commentary on President Lee's speech, described the three pre-conditions as 
impossible and said Lee was attempting to create a system of "one country, two 
governments." 
Jiang Zemin, General Secretary of the PRC, on June 11 "praised" Lee's proposal 
However, he added that some of Lee's remarks were "very improper and lacking in 
sincerity." Meanwhile, Jiang proposed talks between his party and the ruling KMT in 
Taiwan. Jiang's proposal was rejected by the ROC government which insists that talks must 
be between the two rival governments. 
The ROC government denied that it supports or plans to implement the so-called 
"one country, two governments" policy. Shao Yu-ming, ROC government spokesman, said 
on June 13 that the so-called "one country, two governments" is a political reality that was 
created by the Chinese Communists when it signed the August 17 Shanghai Communique 
with the United States. 
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In his inaugural speech, President Lee also announced that the "Period of 
Communist Rebellion" will be ended soon. Under the President's instructions, related 
ministries have begun to prepare for revision of laws effective during the Period of 
Communist Rebellion. It is expected that entry restrictions for mainlanders and dissidents 
will be relaxed. [Ref. 9, p. 203] 
c. Lee's 1996 Inaugural Address 
On May 20, 1996, President Lee in his inaugural address expressed the ROC's 
policy on cross-Strait relations. He said: 
In an attempt to influence the outcome of the first popular presidential election 
in March, the Chinese Communists conducted a series of military exercises 
against Taiwan, but unrivaled restraint prevailed in this country. We know that 
it is imperative that peace and stability be maintained in the Asia-Pacific region. 
More important, we would not like to see the sudden disappearance of the 
economic growth in mainland China that has been made possible with great 
difficulty by its openness policy over the years. Patience on the part of the 21.3 
million people is not tantamount to cowardice. Because we believe quiet 
tolerance is the only way to dispel enmity bred by confrontation. We will never 
negotiate under threat of attack, but we do not fear to negotiate. Our position is 
that dialogue will lead to the resolution of any issues between the two sides of 
the Taiwan Straits. 
The Republic of China has always been a sovereign state. Disputes across the 
Straits center around system and lifestyle; they have nothing to do with ethnic 
or cultural identity. Here in this country it is totally unnecessary or impossible 
to adopt the so-called course of "Taiwan independence." For over 40 years, the 
two sides of the Strait have been two separate jurisdictions due to various 
historical factors, but it is also true that both sides pursue eventual national 
unification. Only when both sides face up to the facts and engage in dialogue 
with profound sincerity and patience will they be able to find the solution to the 
unification question and work for the common welfare of the Chinese people. 
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Today, I will seriously call upon the two sides of the Strait to deal 
straightforwardly with the momentous questions of how to terminate the state 
of hostility between them, which will then make a crucial contribution to the 
historic task of unification. In the future, at the call of my country and with the 
support of its people, I would like to embark upon a journey of peace to 
mainland China taking with me the consensus and will of the 21.3 million 
people. I am also ready to meet with the top leadership of the Chinese 
Communists for a direct exchange of views in order to open up a new era of 
communication and cooperation between the two sides and ensure peace, 
stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.[Ref. 12, pp. 5-6] 
However, in late 1995, Beijing unilaterally suspended talks with Taipei in protest 
of President Lee's visit to the United States. After the visit, the PRC staged a series of 
military exercises adjacent to Taiwan to emphasize its dissatisfaction with the visit. These 
military exercises have brought cross-Strait relations to a low ebb. 
In his 1996 inaugural address, Lee expressed a pronounced desire for peaceful 
and stable cross-Strait exchanges. His reiteration that independence is an unnecessary option 
for Taiwan was aimed at reassuring Beijing. Another sign of Lee's desire to improve 
cross-Strait relations was his suggestion that he could visit Mainland China if conditions are 
suitable. This statement indicated the likelihood that Lee and the ROC will seize an 
opportunity to create a favorable atmosphere to ease cross-Strait tensions. 
B. PRC'S POLITICAL POLICY DEVELOPMENT TOWARD THE ROC 
The PRC' s policies toward Taiwan have advocated a goal of a "one China policy" for 
more than 40 years. During the past some 4 7 years, the PRC has tried at least four different 
approaches to achieve that goal. Immediately after the central government left the mainland 
for Taiwan in 1949, the PRC proclaimed that they were going to "liberate Taiwan through 
military means." But the initial steps in that attempt, taken later that year, were foiled as the 
PRC offensive against Kinmen and other offshore islands suffered decisive defeats. After 
that strategy failed, the PRC changed their slogan to "Liberate Taiwan through peaceful 
means." This slogan lost all credence in August 1958, however, when the PRC forces began 
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heavy shelling of Kinmen, an action that attracted international attention and prompted a 
heightened U.S. naval presence in the Taiwan Strait. 
In the 1970's, when Communist China was admitted to the United Nations and 
established diplomatic relations with the United States, a different strategy evolved. Instead 
of "liberating" Taiwan, mainland leaders said they would seek "to unify China through 
peaceful means," while reserving the right "to solve the Taiwan problem through military 
means." Throughout the 1970's and the early 1980's, Beijing made a broad assortment of 
offers to lure the ROC into reunification negotiations. However, these overtures carried 
unacceptable assumptions and conditions, and were therefore flatly rejected. Following the 
1984 negotiations by London and Beijing on Hong Kong's future status, the mainland 
leadership began proclaiming the formula of "one country, two systems" as the best way to 
"recover Taiwan to reunify China." Clearly, the PRC still maintains a keen interest in a one 
China policy, but it will adopt whatever means it considers most effective to do so. 
1. One China Policy of Mao Era 
The PRC conceived a "one China policy" in the 1950's. In May 1955 the late Premier 
Zhou Enlai said at the Standing Committee Meeting that two alternatives were open to the 
Chinese people for the solution of the reunification - to resort to war or by peaceful means. 
In April 1956, the late Chairman Mao Zedong put forward his thoughts about this matter 
when he said that "peace is the best option" [Ref. 13, p. 14]. 
In February 1972, U.S. President Richard Nixon visited the PRC and issued a joint 
communique in Shanghai stating that: "The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on 
either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of 
China. The United States Government does not challenge that position." [Ref. 13, p. 11] 
2. The "One Country, Two Systems" Policy of the Deng Era 
On January 1, 1979, the StandingCommitteeofthe NationalPeople'sCongressofthe 
People's Republic of China issued a message to the people in Taiwan pronouncing the PRC 
Government's basic position regarding peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question. It called 
for the holding of talks between the two sides of the Strait to seek an end to the military 
confrontation. It pledged that in the pursuit of national reunification, the PRC "will respect 
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the status quo on Taiwan and the views of people of all walks of life there and adopt 
reasonable policies and measures." 
In a statement on September 30, 1981, the late Chairman Y e Jianying of the Standing 
Committee further elaborated the policy and principles for the settlement of the Taiwan 
question. He affirmed that "after the country is reunified, Taiwan can enjoy a high degree of 
autonomy as a special administrative region" and proposed that talks be held on an equal 
footing between the ruling political parties on each side of the Strait, namely, the Chinese 
Communist Party and the Kuomintang. 
Referring to Ye Jianying's remarks, the PRC leader Deng Xiaoping pointed out on 
January II. 19~C. that this in effect meant "one country, two systems," i.e., on the premise 
of national n:uni fication, the main body of the nation would continue with its socialist system 
while Taiwan could maintain its capitalist system. 
On June 26, 1983, Deng Xiaoping further enunciated the concept of peaceful 
reunification. stressing that the crucial point was national reunification. He went on to 
expound the PRC's policy on reunification and on the creation of a Taiwan special 
administrative region. [Ref. 13, p. 15] Its basic contents are as follows: 
a. Only One China 
There is only one China in the world, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China and 
the seat of China's central government is in Beijing. This is a universally recognized fact as 
well as the premise for a peaceful settlement of the unification question. 
The PRC is firmly against any words or deeds designed to split China's 
sovereignty and territorialintegrity.lt opposes "two Chinas," "one China, one Taiwan," "one 
country, two governments" or any attempt or act that could lead to the "independence of 
Taiwan." The Chinese people on both sides of the Strait all believe that there is only one 
China and espouse national reunification. Taiwan's status as an inalienable part of China has 
been determined and cannot be changed. "Self-determination" for Taiwan is out of the 
question. 
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b. Coexistence of Two Systems 
According to the PRC' s policies, on the premise of one China, socialism on the 
mainland and capitalism on Taiwan can coexist and develop side by side for a long time 
without one swallowing up the other. This concept has largely taken account of the actual 
situation in Taiwan and practical interests of the people there.lt will be a unique feature and 
important innovation in the state system of a reunified China. 
Also, the PRC's current policies emphasize that after reunification, Taiwan's 
current socio-economic system, its way of life as well as economic and cultural ties with 
foreign countries can remain unchanged. Private property, including houses and land, as well 
as business ownership, legal inheritance and overseas Chinese and foreign investments on 
the island will all be protected by law. 
c. A High Degree of Autonomy 
The PRC claims that after reunification, Taiwan will become a special 
administrativeregion.lt will be distinguished from the other provinces or regions of China 
by its high degree of autonomy. It will have its own administrative and legislative powers, 
an independent judiciary and the right of adjudication on the island. It will run its own party 
and its political, military, economic and financial affairs. It may conclude commercial and 
cultural agreements with foreign countries and enjoy certain rights in foreign affairs. It may 
keep its military forces and the mainland will not dispatch troops or administrative personnel 
to the island. On the other hand, representatives of the government of the special 
administrative region and those from different government levels in Taiwan may be 
appointed to senior posts in the central government and participate in the running of national 
affairs. 
~ PeaceJVegodadons 
It is also the PRC's common aspiration is for the entire Chinese people to 
achieve reunification of the country by peaceful means through contacts and negotiations. 
People on both sides of the Strait are all Chinese. To them it would be a great tragedy for all 
if China's territorial integrity and sovereignty were to be split and its people were to be 
drawn into a fratricide. Peaceful reunification will greatly enhance the cohesion of the 
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Chinese nation. It will facilitate Taiwan's socio-economic stability and development and 
promote the resurgence and prosperity of China as a whole. [Ref. 13, pp. 17-18] 
3. The Jiang Zemin's Eight-point Speech 
On the eve of the Lunar New Year in 1995, Jiang Zemin, President of the PRC, 
delivered an important eight-point speech on the development of cross-Strait relations and 
reunification. The statement indicating that Beijing's Taiwan policy would enter into a new 
phase. 
In his speech, Jiang first reiterated adherence to the principle of one China and firm 
opposition to any words or actions in contravention of the principle, indicating that Beijing's 
"one China" stand will remain unchanged. 
Second, Jiang pointed out that Beijing has no objection to Taiwan'snongovernmental 
economic and cultural ties with other countries. "No objection" does not necessarily mean 
"endorsement." In other words, he believes that Beijing will adopt corresponding stances 
after evaluating the nature, real objectives, and possible consequences of these ties. Political 
and diplomatic contacts, however, will not be tolerated. Jiang also expressed the view that 
only after the peaceful reunification is accomplished can the Taiwan people and other 
Chinese people of all ethnic groups fully share the dignity attained by China internationally, 
thus taking issue with Taipei's quest to expand its international "living space" and to be 
accorded a share of international dignity. 
Third, Jiang suggested that peace talks be held between the two sides on the premise 
that there is only one China, saying that the scope of participants could be expanded to 
include representatives from various political parties and mass organizations and that any 
matter could be discussed, nonetheless, the official ending of the state of hostility between 
the two sides should be the starting point. This indicates that Beijing now places the hope 
of unification not only on the Taiwan authorities and people, but also on various political 
parties and the leader of Taiwan. Jiang added that on the basis of a peace agreement, the two 
sides should undertake jointly to safeguard China's sovereignty and integrity and map out 
plans for the future development of their relations. Thus, to invite Taiwan to jointly map out 
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plans for their future relations will be a major element of Beijing's Taiwan policy in the 
future. 
Fourth, Jiang emphasized Beijing's hope for peaceful reunification, pointing out that 
its refusal to renounce the use of force is not directed against the Taiwan people, but against 
the foreign forces interfering with China's reunification and the foreign or local forces 
attempting to bring about "Taiwan independence." Jiang thus repeated Beijing's principled 
position of insisting on national unification, territorial integrity, and objection to foreign 
intervention in China's internal affairs. 
Fifth, Jiang stressed that political differences should not affect the expansion of 
economic exchanges and cooperation between the two sides, implying that Taiwan should 
not make use of economic and cultural exchanges to posture itself as a political entity equal 
to Beijing. In particular, he mentioned that Beijing would protect the legitimate rights and 
interests of Taiwan industrialists and businessmen by signing a nongovernmental investment 
protection agreement. He also called for adoption of practical measures to speed up the 
establishment of postal, air and shipping services, and trade between the two sides. All of this 
indicates an endeavor by Beijing to win over more Taiwan businessmen in order to increase 
pressure on the Taiwan government. 
Sixth, Jiang described Chinese culture as the spiritual tie holding the entire Chinese 
people together and a basis for China's peaceful reunification. He did not speak of the 
superiority of socialism, thereby evading the issues that the two sides are implementing 
different systems and that the "one country, two systems" formula has internal 
contradictions. Therefore, promoting cultural ties to enhance unification will also be an 
important part of Beijing's new Taiwan policy. 
Seventh, Jiang noted that Beijing would fully respect the lifestyle of the people in 
Taiwan and their wish to be their own masters. He was likely referring to Taiwan's capitalist 
economic system and its political system, including democratic elections at various levels. 
Thus, Beijing could adopt a more conciliatory approach toward Taiwan. Jiang also 
emphasized that mainland Chinese organizations, including agencies stationed abroad, 
should all improve their services to the Taiwan people. 
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Finally, Jiang proposed that the leaders ofthe two sides could exchange visits. In 
other words, in the post-Deng era, Beijing will promote direct talks between the leaders of 
the two sides to bring about a breakthrough in cross-Strait relations and accelerate China's 
unification. This is a new strategy that Jiang has introduced into Beijing's Taiwan policy. 
[Ref. 14, pp. 1-3] 
Jiang's eight-point speech did not deviate from Beijing's established principles with 
regard to the Taiwan issue. Jiang's statement demonstrates that he would probably continue 
to implement the Deng Xiaoping's line. 
During the past four decades, Beijing's strategy toward Taiwan was based on 
"prevention ofTaiwan independence" and the "promotion of national unification." Jiang's 
speech, however, signals a more balanced approach. One important element of Beijing's 
anti-independenceendeavors will be to counter international support for pro-independence 
forces in Taiwan. Another will be to prevent Taipei from internationalizing the cross-Strait 
issue through its activities in the international community and international organizations. 
As for unification, instead of simply pushing the "one country, two systems" propaganda, 
Beijing is likely to adopt a more practical approach in which cross-Strait economic and trade 
ties, people-to-people exchanges, nonpolitical negotiations, and, in particular, a meeting 
between the leaders of the two sides will play important roles. [Ref. 14, p. 5] 
C. SUMMARY 
Between 1970 and the present the PRC's position has undergone three major shifts. 
First, under Mao, a one-China policy was emphasized. Second, under Deng a policy of one 
country but two systems was set forth, and under Jiang, an eight-point was proposed which 
still focuses on the first two policies- one china policy and one country but two systems. 
On the other side, between 1980 and the present the ROC has undergone three major 
shifts. First, under Chiang Ching-kuo, reunification under the Three Principles of the People 
was set forth. Second, under Lee, three pre-conditions was emphasized which were one, the 
PRC must implement political democracy, two, renounce the use of force against Taiwan and 
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three, not interfere with the ROC's foreign relations based on the one China policy. During 
Lee's second term of presidency, he suggested that he could visit Mainland China. 
In Lee's inaugural address of 1990 and 1996 he sets forth the seeds for the 
reunification of Taiwan and Mainland China .. In Jiang Zemin's eight-point speech, these 
PRC policies are restated with the exception of the renouncement of the use of force to 
reunify China. 
The ROC for its part, intends to pursue a practical policy of both economic and 
people-to-people reunification. The PRC even though not renouncing the use of force has 
come to the realization that it is not a practical option. 
Despite the gradual toning down of policies between the PRC and the ROC regarding, 
the progress toward reunification has been very limited. In fact, the only concrete step 
toward the future cross-Strait relations is that both two sides leaders agreed to visit each 
other in order to improve the future relationship. 
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IV. EACH GOVERNMENT'S CURRENT STRATEGY 
In Chapter III, the author addressed policies developed by the ROC and the PRC over 
the past 47 years. In order to achieve its own political goals, each government has used 
different strategies and approaches. In this chapter, the author will examine both 
governments' current political strategies in terms of cross-Strait relations. 
A. THE ROC'S CURRENT STRATEGIES TOWARD THE PRC 
The ROC strategies are based on their Guidelines for National Unification. The 
Guidelines state that China's unification should be achieved in three phases which are a 
short-term phase of exchanges and reciprocity, a medium-term phase of mutual trust and 
cooperation and a long-term phase of consultation and unification. Currently, the ROC is 
convinced that the relations are in the short-term phase. [Ref. 19, p.3] In order to achieve 
their political objectives in the short-term phase, there are four major strategies to approach 
it: 
• Re-Entering The United Nations 
• Promoting Pragmatic Foreign Relations 
• Strengthening National Defense Capability 
• Limiting The Investment In The PRC 
1. Re-entering the United Nations 
In October 1971, the General Assembly of the United Nations, with the acquiescence 
of the United States, voted to transfer the "Chinese seat" from the ROC to the PRC. As a 
result, the ROC lost its membership. Therefore, since 1971, the ROC has essentially been 
isolated in the international diplomatic community. 
The ROC was an original member ofthe U.N. and the membership dates from the 
founding of the U.N. at the conclusion of the Second World War. Besides, the ROC was one 
of the Security Council (where five states hold veto powers on nonprocedural 
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matters)members. The ROC's efforts to re-entry the U.N. date from the beginning of the 
1990's when it became evident to the ROC leadership that the circumstances governing 
international affairs had radically altered. At that point, President Lee charged the relevant 
national ministries of the ROC to explore the issue of full participation in the U.N. [Ref. 15, 
pp. 124-126] 
The ROC is convinced that reality will eventually persuade Beijing to withdraw its 
objections to the ROC's full participation in the international community. In addition, the 
ROC claims there is no credible evidence that ROC participation would do anything to 
impair the prospects of the ultimate reunification of China. 
In fact, experience would support this. For instance, in 1973, both East and West 
Germany entered the United Nations as full participants. The Marxist German Democratic 
Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany normalized their relations with the Treaty 
of December 1973. This dual membership arrangement did not inhibit the ultimate 
reunificationofthe German nations divided since the Second World War. Similarly, in the 
fall of 1991, North and South Korea simultaneously entered the United Nations as full 
participants. Neither Pyongyang nor Seoul has expressed any fears that this would obstruct 
the ultimate reunification of the Korean peninsula. [Ref. 15, p. 131] 
The ROC emphasizes that a case could be made that the full representation of all of 
China in the U.N. would foster, rather than retard reunification by enhancing contact and 
interaction between the ROC and the PRC in the neutral environment of international 
forums. The ROC believes that contact between the ROC and the PRC in circumstances of 
equity and mutual regard could only solidify the foundation upon which a united, democratic 
and prosperous China might be built. 
In this respect, the ROC pursues those rights available to their people as members of 
the law-governed international community. International law, like law in general, is 
predicated on equity and reason. Every principle of equity and every measure of right reason 
argue for the full participation of the ROC in the U.N. These, together with compelling 
pragmatic considerations, call for ROC membership in all regional and international bodies. 
[Ref. 15, p. 133] 
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2. Promoting Pragmatic Foreign Relations 
Besides the policy of re-entering the U.N., in order to gain more recognition in the 
international community and internationalize the cross-Strait issue, the ROC has also 
adopted a pragmatic foreign policy since the late 1980's. Developments in the international 
community pose many foreign relations challenges for the ROC. 
According to The Republic of China Year book 1994, the greatest such challenge stems 
from the obstructive tactics ofthe PRC to circumscribe the ROC's international activities. 
For many years, Beijing has sought to isolate the ROC from the world community and in 
recent years has redoubled these efforts. The PRC mind set behind these consistent attempts 
to hamper the ROC's international activities has been molded by Beijing's proposal for a 
"one country, two systems" nation. The dual system model insists that China should be 
united under a single communist leadership in Beijing and that the ROC government be 
reduced to the status of a local authority. Taiwan may maintain an autonomous economic 
system but not its own foreign policy. Guided by the "one country, two systems" model, 
Beijing has threatened to "sever or downgrade relations" with any country that intends to 
establish or strengthen relations with the ROC. The PRC has fomented much controversy 
over the issue of the "right of representation," "membership," and "name" to obstruct ROC 
participation in international organizations and activities. They have also attempted to 
prevent its participation in several nonpolitical and regional economic organizations." [Ref. 
17,p.171] 
Therefore, in order to counter those PRC's blocking strategies, as well as to keep 
abreast of new developments in the world politic, the ROC has adopted a pragmatic approach 
of diplomatic activism. This means that the ROC would advocate pragmatism and 
moderation in relations with foreign countries. [Ref. 18, p. 215] 
The Foreign Affair Department of the ROC maintains that the ROC will continue to 
strengthen mutual relations with friendly countries, and to establish and strengthen 
economic, cultural, and technological relations with less-hostile nations. The ROC will also 
actively participate in international organizations and activities to maintain and enhance its 
international status. [Ref. 17, p. 172] 
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3. Strengthening National Defense Capability 
According to the ROC's 1996 National Defense Report, the ROC's National Defense 
is to defend the integrity of her national territory, sovereignty, and her people. In doing so, 
the ROC has to be prepared for war, to take action for "keeping peace internally, and to repel 
aggression externally" in order to safeguard her security [Ref. 16, p. 57]. In fact, the most 
direct and the most serious threat to the ROC is the PRC's invasion capability. 
At the present time, the PRC is exploiting its interaction across the Strait to expedite 
realization of their "one country, two systems" policy. At the same time the PRC is 
increasing their military modernization to prepare their forces to threaten the ROC as well 
as foreign powers. For example, in March of 1996, the PRC used military missile exercises 
near Taiwan as a protest against the ROC's pragmatic diplomacy and in an attempt to 
influence presidential election. Specifically, on April 9, 1993, President Lee Teng-hui 
pointed out that: 
Although we have voluntarily declared the termination of the Period ofNational 
Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion and renounced the 
use of force as a means for settling disputes between the two sides of the Taiwan 
Strait, the threat of military invasion of Taiwan posed by the Chinese 
communists is still on the horizon. Therefore, under the premise of maintaining 
national security and safeguarding the welfare of the 20 million people living in 
the Taiwan area, our national defense policy is geared to maintaining the 
stability ofthe Taiwan Strait.. ... [Re£ 17, p. 159] 
Accordingly, the ROC has adopted an overall strategy of a balanced development of 
its Armed Forces with the goal of naval and air supremacy as the highest priority. The 
ROC's national defense policy at the present stage is based on defensive preparations, strict 
implementation of an "elite troop" policy, and development of self-sufficient defense 
technology. The Armed Forces are being restructured, command levels streamlined, 
logistical systems renovated, military school and upper-ranking staff units merged or 
streamlined, and the number of troops reduced [Ref. 17, p. 160]. To counter Beijing's 
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military threat, the ROC must strengthen its own national defense and prepare for any 
possible warfare 
4. Limiting the Investment in the PRC 
Since mid-1989, when the ROC's entrepreneurs began to establish their factories in 
the southeastern coastal provinces of the PRC, Taiwanese investment in the PRC has 
increased by leaps and bounds. According to the ROC's "Guidelines for National 
Unification." an investment in business in the PRC will expand people-to-people contacts 
and promote the social prosperity ofboth sides. [Ref. 19, p.2] 
Presently. according to the ROC's view, Beijing is attempting to "use trade and 
investment for political ends and to use the business people to pressure the government" in 
an effort to expand its influence over Taiwan and force the ROC government to accept its 
"one count~. two systems" arrangement. This combination of persuasion and pressure fails 
to take into account political and economic developmenttrends in Taiwan in recent years and 
pays no regard whatsoever to the real wishes and welfare of the people of Taiwan. If it 
continues, it may inevitably have a negative impact on the unification of China and normal 
exchanges between the two sides of the Strait. [Ref. 1, p. 52] 
On September 14, 1996, President Lee urged business leaders to reduce their 
investment in the PRC to parry Beijing's political aim of turning the Taiwan public against 
the ROC government. Lee's remarks, elaborated on by other top ROC government officials, 
signaled a tightening of the government's policy on investing in the mainland and focused 
public attention on the political risks involved in increased capital flow across the Taiwan 
Strait. He said: 
Communist China is trying to use our people to coerce our government and use 
commerce to achieve political objectives, and is thus intensifying the sense of 
anxiety in all sectors of Taiwan society. We must counter this situation by 
holding to the principles of patience and avoiding any rush, keep up the growth 
and development at home so we will not become people without a base. [Ref. 
20, p. 1] 
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To examine President Lee's statements, it is clear that the ROC is attempting to set a 
more rigid regulation to limit Taiwanese investment in the PRC. 
B. THE PRC'S CURRENT STRATEGY TOWARD THE ROC 
The PRC's current strategies toward the ROC are based on the "one China policy", 
"one country, two systems", and "Preventing Taiwan Independence". The strategies have 
been developed in order to achieve the PRC's political purposes in terms of cross-Strait 
relations. There are: 
• Blocking The ROC's Activities In The International Community 
• Making Hong Kong and Macao As Models For Unification 
• Promoting Cross-Strait Trade And Economic Exchanges 
• Using Military Forces To Threaten The ROC 
1. Blocking the ROC's Activities in the International Community 
The Chinese reunification issue has always been defined by the PRC as a domestic 
issue rather than an international issue. Therefore, the PRC attempts to block any of the 
ROC's activities in the international community. This strategy includes expelling the ROC 
from various international organizations, particularly intergovernmental ones, and taking 
over its seats or membership; courting and seeking diplomatic ties with those countries 
maintaining diplomatic ties with Taipei and forcing them to sever their relationships with 
Taipei; making efforts to establish diplomatic ties with new nations to stop them from 
establishing ties with Taipei; and severing relations with any country which intends to 
establish diplomatic ties with Taipei. The above strategies are closely related to Beijing's 
"one-China" principle. Under this principle, Beijing declares, it will not oppose economic 
and cultural contacts between Taiwan and other countries. Taiwan can use the name of either 
"Taiwan, China" or "Taipei, China" to participate in nongovernmental or specialized 
organizations, attend nongovernmental international conferences, and take part in specific 
foreign activities, but only on the condition that it changes its flag, national name, and 
national anthem. It has to obtain Beijing's permission first before joining specialized 
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international nongovernmental organizations such as the International Olympic Committee, 
and intergovernmental ones such as the Asian Development Bank. [Ref. 21, p.9] 
The PRC claims that the PRC is the sole legal government of China, has the right and 
obligation to exercise state sovereignty and represents the whole of China in international 
organizations. But Beijing has shown some flexibility by acquiescing to Taiwan's 
participation in nongo';'ernmental international organizations. As Wu Jianmin, the PRC 
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Foreign Ministry spok~sman, noted: "We have no objection to Taiwan's joining of 
international 'people-to-people' organizations under proper names." [Ref.22, p.l03] 
The PRC also has agreed grudgingly to Taipei's membership in some international 
intergovernmental economic institutions, but it still insists that Taiwan's participation is 
subject to the terms of agreement or understanding reached between the PRC and the parties 
concerned which explicitly prescribe that the People's Republic of China is a full member 
as a sovereign state; whereas, the ROC may participate in the activities of those 
organizations only as a region of China under the designation of "Taipei, China" or 
"Chinese, Taipei." Of course, the ROC's participation in the United Nations is a different 
matter. Beijing appears determined to bar Taipei's return to this prestigious world body. 
Also, authorities of the PRC claim that regardless of whether Taipei uses the title "Republic 
of China" or "Republic of Taiwan" to rejoin the U.N., Beijing will never accept its 
readmission to the U.N. [Ref. 22, p.104] 
2. Making Hong Kong and Macao as Models for Unification 
Hong Kong and Macao have histories that have been separated from other Chinese 
territories by over a century. Both Hong Kong and Macao were ceded to British and Portugal 
by Ching Dynasty government in the nineteen century. 
After losing the Opium War, the Ching dynasty government was compelled to sign 
the Treaty ofNanjing in 1842 and to cede Hong Kong to Britain. In 1982, Britain opened 
negotiations with the PRC for the return of Hong Kong. On September 26, 1984, London and 
Peking signed a joint declaration in which they agreed that Hong Kong, after 150 years of 
British rule, was to be handed over to the PRC on July 1, 1997. Also, in 1986, the PRC 
established the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in accordance with Article 31 of 
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their constitution and promised to maintain Hong Kong's capitalist system intact for fifty 
years after 1997. In April 1990, the PRC' s seventh "National People's Congress" drew up 
and promulgated the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 
accordance with the principles of the joint declaration. [Ref. 23, p. 150] 
Macao, like Hong Kong, was deeded to the Portuguese under a treaty signed in 1887. 
In August 1979. Portugal established diplomatic relations with the PRC and redefined Macao 
as a part of China temporarily administenrl by a governor appointed from Portugal. In July 
1987, Portugal and the PRC issued the Joint Declaration on the Future of Macao, stating that 
Macao would he returned to China in December 1999. [Ref. 23, p. 149] 
According to the PRC, the formula of "one country, two systems" will allow Hong 
Kong and Macao to keep their capitalism for five decades. After that period, whether this 
formula can he continued and become a PRC's fundamental policy will depend on the 
political and economic conditions of the PRC at that time [Ref. 21, p. 6]. Because of the 
ROC's refusal to adopt the PRC's "one country, two systems" formula, the PRC must try to 
build the best model of "one country, two systems" in Hong Kong and Macao. This 
demonstration could then force the ROC to accept the formula. 
3. Promoting Cross-Strait Trade and Economic Exchanges 
In the Post-Cold War era, the PRC' s economic development has been a common focus 
of the international community. In the past several years, to accelerate mainland China's 
economic development, Beijing has spared no efforts in attracting urgently needed capital 
from the ROC, which is known for its huge foreign exchange reserves. But aside from the 
interest in economic development on the Chinese mainland, the promotion of cross-Strait 
trade and economic relations has also carried political aims. For one thing, these close 
economic ties would effectively curb separatist tendencies in the ROC. The further 
development of the economic relationships would encourage more people-to-people contacts 
on both sides and enhance their common understanding of each other, which, in turn would 
help resolve the current stalemate by forcing the ROC authorities to make concessions and 
hold political talks with Beijing. This strategy is evidenced by Beijing's reiteration of 
"reaching political goals through economic means," and "forcing the Taiwan authorities to 
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make concessions through public opinion." It was also explicitly explained by the former 
President Yang Shang-kun in 1990 in his speech at the national conference on Taiwan 
affairs: 
Our economic work in regard to Taiwan should be handled in line with the 
strategy for the peaceful unification with the motherland. Developing mutual 
economic relations and promoting linkages between the two sides are forceful 
means of curbing separatist tendencies in Taiwan and realizing [China's] 
peaceful unification. While economic laws are to be observed, economic work 
pertaining to Taiwan should serve the political task of realizing peaceful 
unification. [Ref. 21, p. 8] 
In other words, the main purpose of the PRC's promoting cross-Strait trade and economic 
exchanges is forcing the ROC's government and people to accept the PRC's political 
intention. 
4. Using Military Forces to Threaten the ROC 
This strategy has remained unchanged since 1949 when Mao established the PRC in 
Beijing. Recently, the PRC reiterated this strategy several times because of the ROC's policy 
ofre-enteringthe U.N. and promotingpragmaticforeignrelationsand the booming activities 
of the "independent movement" in Taiwan as well as overseas. Beijing believes that the 
threat of force will discourage the pro-independence movement in Taiwan and prevent the 
foreign powers interfering in the unification issue. 
In January 1995, President Jiang Zemin addressing the subject of" continue to promote 
the Reunification of the Motherland" said that: 
Efforts should be made to achieve peaceful reunification of China. Chinese 
should not fight fellow Chinese. We do not forswear the use of force, however, 
this is not directed at our Taiwan compatriots, but at foreign forces attempting 
to interfere in China's reunification and seek the independence ofT aiwan. [Ref. 
24, p. 15] 
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According to Jiang's speech, Beijing would continue to reiterate the option of using 
force to prevent foreign powers form getting involved, to curb Taiwan independence 
activities, and to force the ROC to the negotiation table. 
C. SUMMARY 
It is clear that, currently, the PRC and the ROC are using quite different strategies to 
achieve their own political goals. The ROC sees re-entering the U.N., strengthening national 
defense, promoting pragmatic foreign relationships, and limiting the investment in the PRC. 
On the other side, the PRC is using blocking the ROC's activities in the international 
community, making Hong Kong and Macao as models for unification, promoting cross-Strait 
trade and economic exchanges, and using military forces to threaten the ROC to approach 
its political intention.(see Table 1.) 
By identify each government's current strategies, we can easily point out that both the 
PRC and ROC define the cross-Strait relations with different categories. The PRC simply 
said that the cross-Strait relationship is a part of internal affairs and it is no need to be 
influenced by any foreign powers. Conversely, the ROC is convinced that cross-Strait 
relationship is a sort of international issue. The PRC opposes any words or deeds bent on 
creating "independence of Taiwan," or attempting to "split the country and rule under 
separate regimes," or creating "two Chinas over a certain period of time," all of which violate 
the principle of"one China." [Ref.24, p.13] The ROC, in fact, is advocating the concept that 
the two sides are already separated into "two political entities on an equal footing and not 
subordinate to each other," and that they have become an "international legal person." The 
ROC is also advocating the idea that the ROC could re-enter the U.N. and other international 
organizations. [Ref. 24, p. 14] 
In this chapter we see that the PRC and the ROC positions widely differ on the 
question of "one country, two systems." The ROC has a strong government and a strong 
defense and the models for Hong Kong and Macao of giving up democratic sovereignty in 
five decades cannot be applied to the ROC. The ROC for its part, supports the concept of 
"one China" but resists any use of force to achieve that goal. The only encouraging 
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development is the economic ties between the ROC and the PRC. Even with the reduced 
involvement of the ROC and investment in the mainland, these ties may improve the 
people-to-people relationships between the two governments. 
THE ROC'S CURRENT STRATEGIES THE PRC'S CURRENT STRATEGY 





Re-entering the United Nations 1. Blocking the ROC's activities in the 
international community 
Promoting pragmatic foreign 2. Making Hong Kong and Macao as a 
relations model for unification 
Strengthening national defense 3. Promoting cross-Strait trade and 
capability economic exchanges 
Limiting the investment in the PRC 4. Using military forces to threaten the 
ROC 
(source: official statements and leaders speeches of both governments) 
Table 1. The ROC and the PRC's current political strategies 
in their cross-Strait relationship 
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V. FACTORS IN THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CROSS-STRAIT 
RELATIONSHIP 
After examining the political lines each government has drawn and each government's 
current strategy, the author is convinced that cross-Strait relations and future developments 
will be determined by the following four major factors: 
• International politics 
• The PRC's stability 
• The ROC's public opinion about Taiwan's independence 
• Interactions between both governments 
A. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
Cross-Strait relations will more than likely be influenced by international politics. 
Politically, international trends toward integration and division are having an impact on 
relations between the two sides. During the Cold War period when ideology was all-
important, the unification policies of divided countries were usually influenced by bloc 
politics and as a result tended to be uncompromising. [Ref. 1, p. 44] Since the end of the 
Cold War, the re-emergence of the idea of integration has encouraged divided countries to 
start once again on the path to unification. One example is the way that the East German 
people's desire for a free and democratic political and economic system and the national 
sentiments of the people of West Germany brought about the democratic unification of 
Germany in October of 1990. Another example is how North and South Korea, on the basis 
of peace and parity, signed a non-aggressionand reconciliation pact in December 1991. [Ref. 
25, pp. 133-135] These examples of divided countries being encouraged to progress toward 
unification or compromise because of changes in the world political and economic order 
have become one of characteristics of the post-Cold War period. 
Additionally, since the end of the Cold War, long-repressed ethnic groups have 
experienced a revival of nationalism which has engendered notable separatist demands. For 
example, the Soviet Union has split into fifteen separate countries. The two ethnic groups 
of Czechoslovakia agreed by common consent to divide into two separate states: the Czech 
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Republic and Slovakia. Also, Yugoslavia was influenced by separatism and has been 
separated into three states. These two trends of integration and separatism have had an 
impact across the Taiwan Strait. Currently, both the PRC and ROC's official policies 
regarding the issue of national unification are an affirmation of this trend toward integration 
However, proposals for Taiwan's independence have also been stimulated by the separatist 
trend. For the moment Taiwan is a democratic society, with freedom of speech and thought, 
which has inevitably been influenced by both integrationist and separatist ideas. According 
to the ROC's perspectives, the ROC government believes that it should be working towards 
integration, but objectively, the degree of acceptance which these two trends enjoy among 
the people of Taiwan will depend on the future developments in the relations between the 
two sides. If cross-Strait relations could not be improved, the likelihood of reunification 
might grow darker. On the other hand, ifthere is friendly interaction between the two sides, 
the development of separatism will be hindered. [Ref. 1, pp. 45-46] 
Economically, although the PRC claims that Taiwan is a part of China, in reality 
Taiwan is also a part of the world at large, and what is more important, it is the world's 
fourteenth largest trading nation in 1995. (see Table 2.) Therefore, in the ROC's quest for 
the right to exist, develop, and receive respect, the ROC would be considered a part of the 
international community. If Beijing continues to push the ROC out of the international arena 
or suppress the ROC in the international activities, it would create a negative impact on the 
cross-Strait relationship. 
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Country Ranking Total Export/Import in U.S. Hundred Million Dollar Percentage of World Trade 
Total 101,800 100.0% 
U.S. 1 13,547 13.3% 
Germany 2 9,481 9.3% 
Japan 3 7,789 7.7% 
France 4 5,569 5.5% 
United Kingdom 5 5,046 5.0% 
Italy 6 4,359 4.3% 
Netherlands 7 3,750 3.7% 
Hong Kong 8 3,714 3.6% 
Canada 9 3,639 3.6% 
Belgium 10 3,184 3.1% 
PRC 11 2,808 2.8% 
South Korea 12 2,603 2.6% 
Singapore 13 2,433 2.4% 
ROC 14 2,152 2.1% 
Spain 15 2,073 2.0% 
Switzerland 16 1,615 1.6% 
Mexico 17 1,523 1.5% 
Malaysia 18 1,517 1.5% 
Sweden 19 1,439 1.4% 
Austria 20 1,254 1.2% 
[Ref. 34 p.53 ](source: WTO secretary council) 
Table 2. Major Trading Countries ofthe World in 1995 
In contrast to the above scenario, recently both the ROC and PRC are preparing to 
enter the World Trade Organization (WTO, the former General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, GATT, in January 1995 reorganized under the new title). After both Beijing and 
Taipei become members of the WTO, their economic cooperation or competition and 
Beijing's attitude toward Taipei's endeavor to expand its developing space in the 
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international community will also affect the development of cross-Strait relations. After 
joining the WTO, mainland China's economic and trade systems must operate within the 
WTO' s legal framework and other international practices. This constitutes a promoting force, 
a pressure, and a challenge to the mainland Chinese economy. According to the principle that 
member states have equal rights and interests and the principle of multilateral arbitration, 
cross-Strait relations will also be governed by international practices. Thus, the PRC and the 
ROC will need frank and earnest consultations to set up a new formula for their interaction 
in the international community. [Ref. 14, p. 10] 
B. THE PRC'S STABILITY 
Most observers believe that the PRC's economic reform policy will continue after 
Deng's death, but they are not sure whether the PRC will remain a stable and cooperative 
regional partner to other countries in the post-Deng era. [Ref. 14, p. 6] In the ROC's view, 
the PRC's stability is a matter of great concern to Taipei because it is the foundation for the 
development of cross-Strait relations. Of course, the PRC' s political, economic, and social 
changes would affect cross-Strait relations. 
Politically, the key to the PRC's future political situation is whether the Chinese 
communist leadership, with the Politiburo Standing Committee as the nucleus, will be 
united. Another important factor is whether the National People's Congress (NPC) and 
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) will adopt the position in the 
personnel arrangements and political maneuvering in accordance with the principle of 
political consultations and multiparty cooperation. It is very likely that the NPC' s functional 
powers, such as those related to decision making, discussion of political affairs, legislation, 
foreign policy, and auditing will be expanded and that multiparty cooperation will be a basic 
part of the PRC' s political system. The CPPCC will also have the power to participate in and 
supervise government and political affairs, and to nominate candidates during elections. In 
the future, as the ownership structure diversifies, the management and distribution systems 
continue to change, new systems replace the old ones, and interest readjustments entail 
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conflicts, the operation of the NPC and the CPPCC will be a decisive factor in the political 
situation of the PRC. [Ref. 14, p. 7] 
Economically, since 1980, Beijing's financial capabilities have been declining, 
especially in balancing national budget. This affects its ability to allocate resources and to 
cope with crises. It is also facing serious difficulties in transforming the operating 
mechanisms of state-owned enterprises and in resolving the unemployment problem. The 
promulgation of the Regulations on the Placement of Surplus Staff and Workers by the State 
Council cannot resolve the issue. According to the PRC' s Ministry of Labor, there were 1.5 
million unemployed people in the PRC in 1994. However, ifhidden unemployment had been 
taken into acwunt, the real unemployed figures would have been closer to 5 million. The 
unemployml.'nt rate during the next five years would be 4 or 5 percent higher. Allowing for 
the increasl.' of population, there will be 268 million people waiting for work by the tum of 
this century. I Ref. 26, p. 2] 
Socially. it is obvious that agricultural and rural social problems, such as slowly 
increasing incomes but heavier burden for farmers, insufficient agricultural investments, and 
surplus rural laborers, cannot be neglected. Since 1985, farmers have increased production, 
but their incomes have not increased accordingly. For instance, during the Seventh Five-Year 
Plan period (1986-90), farmers' incomes increased by only 1.3 percent . This slow increase 
in farmers' incomes constitutes a major factor behind rural social unrest. Rural problems, 
especially the relationship between the state and farmers, are very important. An essential 
task of the state would be to guide farmers to develop market-oriented collective economic 
units in cities and towns to consolidate the foundation of agriculture. 
All the above-mentioned problems will affect the PRC's future situation. Hopefully, 
that the PRC would remain stable in the near future. If the situation gets out of control, it is 
highly possible that Beijing could shift its focus away from its internal crises and seek 
compensationforits frustration by adopting a tougher stance toward the ROC. [Ref. 14, p. 
9] 
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C. THE ROC'S PUBLIC OPINION OF TAIWAN INDEPENDENCE 
The PRC is convinced that the "Taiwan independence" issue remains the biggest 
obstacle to the development of cross-Strait relations. Shortly after Jiang Zemin made his 
eight-point peace overture, the ROC's opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP), remarked that Beijing's stance of nonrecognition remained unchanged as it still 
refused to recognize the fact that the two sides of the Strait are ruled by two different 
governments. Taiwan's status is as an international legal entity. Taiwan has its own laws, 
government, and president of state. Also, Taiwan has it's independent jurisdiction system. 
On February 5, 1995, at the DPP's meeting in Taipei, the members' purpose was to 
study and revise this party's constitution and programs proposed to confront the "Jiang's 
eight points" speech with the DPP "Taiwan independence" program. According to Chen 
Fang-ming, head ofthe DPP's Central Propaganda Department, the DPP would not revise 
its party constitution because of Jiang's eight-point proposal. He said that the DPP would 
not be intimidated into giving up "Taiwan independence" as a result of Beijing's threats, nor 
would it deliberately emphasize "Taiwan independence" because of Beijing's concessions. 
[Ref. 27, p. 11] 
In fact, up until May, 1993, the percentage of people supporting Taiwan independence 
is increasing year by year (see Table 3.). Furthermore, in August 1995 and March 1996, 
the PRC carried out missile tests and military exercises to threaten Taiwan. As a result, more 
and more people in the ROC distrusted Jiang's statement that "Chinese should not fight 
fellow Chinese" which he made in his eight-point proposal, even more people support the 
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Sources: Mainland Policy: Selected Opinion Polls Conducted in Taiwan 1988-92, Mainland Affairs Council, The Executive 
Yuan, Taipei, Republic of China, August 1992, p. 6; Zhongyang ribao [Central Daily News, Taipei], I November 1992, p. I; 11 
May 1993, p. I, data provided by the Public Opinion Poll Centre of the Lianhebao. Reprinted from China Quarterly, No. 136, 
December 1993, p. 829. 
Table 3. Public Opinion on Taiwan Independence 
Currently, the ROC's ruling party, KMT (Kuomintang)and the New Party (the second 
largest opposition party) claim to support national unification but, both the KMT and the 
New Party do not want Taiwan to move anytime soon towards reunification. [Ref. 28, p. 40] 
For Taiwanese, the idea of an immediate reunification is not particularly attractive. 
Relatively small in size, Taiwan has been stunned by the financial burden that reunification 
49 
has broughtto the people of West German. Therefore, most of the ROC's people prefer the 
status quo. 
The dispute about "unification" and "independence" within Taiwan intensifies with 
each ofBeijing's announcements and actions regarding its Taiwan policy. This divergence 
of public opinion will not vanish in a short period of time. Therefore, in the near future, 
cross-Strait relations will still be strained and interfered with by the "unification vs. 
independence .. advocates. 
D. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES 
Another factor influencing future relations between the two sides of the Strait is the 
interactions hctwecn both governments. Economically, both the PRC and the ROC attach 
great imponance to economic cooperation. In early 1995, the ROC Premier Lien Chan 
declared that economic and trade ties should be the axis of cross-Strait relations. [Ref.15, pp 
197-213] The P R C President Jiang Zemin also emphasized in his Spring Festival speech that 
political divergences should not interfere with economic cooperation between the two sides. 
[Ref. 24, pp 13-15] 
According to the PRC's MinistryofForeign Trade and Economic Cooperation, cross-
Strait indirect trade totaled US$16.327 billion in 1994 (see Table 4.) and the two sides 
became each other's fourth largest trading partner. By the end of September 1994, 
businessmen from Taiwan had invested US$7.34 billion in 25,849 projects on mainland 
China. In fact, Taiwan businessmen have become mainland China's second largest source 













from Hong Kong's report from ROC's report from PRC's report 
Export Import Total Export Import Total Export Import 
2,896.5 568.9 3,483.4 - - - - -
3,278.3 765.4 4,043.6 
- - -
2,255.0 319.7 
4,667.2 1,126.0 5,793.1 - 597.5 597.5 3,639.0 594.8 
6,287.9 1,119.0 7,406.9 1.1 747.1 748.1 5,881.0 698.0 
7,585.4 11,036.0 8,689.0 16.2 1,015.5 1,031.7 12,933.1 1,461.8 
8,517.2 1,292.3 9,809.5 131.6 1,858.7 1,990.3 14,084.8 2,242.2 
9,882.8 1,574.2 11,457.0 376.6 3,091.4 3,468.0 14,783.9 3,098.1 
931.1 154.7 1,085.8 55.4 325.3 380.7 1,137.9 194.7 
Source: Mainland Affairs Council The Executive Yuan Republic of China July 1994 










While the ROC is taking active steps to build Taiwan into an operations center in the 
Asia-Pacific region, the PRC is also trying to build an Asia-Pacific Operations Center in 
Pudong, Shanghai. Promotion of this plan, reported to the PRC by Wang Daohan, Chairman 
of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARA TS), is the responsibility 
of Zhao Qizheng, Shanghai's deputy mayor. As one can see, the two sides have similar 
economic development strategies. [Ref. 14, p. 12] In the future, the two sides could expand 
their economic exchanges and cooperation, and promote mutually beneficial and reciprocal 
economic and trade relations. From the perspective of global economic development, the 
Asia-Pacific region, and, in particular, East Asia, have great economic potential and is likely 
to become the new global economic hub of the twenty-first century. The ROC has made a 
substantial contribution to the economic development of East Asia, and it occupies a vital 
and irreplaceable position. The PRC' s economy is also becoming more prominent, and it is 
becoming an important economic cooperation partner of East Asian countries. If the two 
sides of the Strait can make use of their mutually complimentary economic resources and 
conditions, they would be able to occupy an important place in the future global economy. 
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Therefore, economic exchanges will be the cornerstone of cross-Strait relations. [Ref. 30, p. 
3] 
Besides the economic exchanges, cultural and educational exchanges are also 
important factors in the future development of the cross-Strait relations. Both sides could 
expand cross-Strait cultural and educational exchanges, which would include increasing 
exchangesofpersonnel and encouraging further exchanges. Additionally, both sides could 
further relax the rules governing visits by specialists, strengthen academic exchanges, and 
reinforce exchanges in the fields of science and technology, sports, news reporting, culture, 
and religion by signing a cultural exchange agreement. Despite the political divergences 
between the PRC and ROC, those exchanges could foster mutual trust in the people-to-
people level between the two sides. 
E. SUMMARY 
In the past 47 years, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have developed different 
policies and strategies and approaches to achieve their own political purposes. Despite the 
disputes regarding integration or separatism, how to improve the future cross-Strait 
relationship is very important to the PRC, the ROC, and the international community. 
Currently, both the PRC and the ROC emphasize that the two sides should be unified 
in the future although with different approaches. After considering the above mentioned 
factors related to the future development of the cross-Strait relationship, it is clear that these 
factors will be the keys to improving future relationship between the PRC and ROC. 
In the ROC, although there is a Taiwan independence movement, it is not in the 
mainstream of ROC society. The ROC government should not just passively pursue "status 
quo." Instead, it should actively address the issue of ways to improve the relationship 
between two sides. Otherwise, the PRC would be convinced that "status quo" is just 
another type of"independence."In the PRC, in order to gain the trust of the ROC's people, 
the PRC should renounce the option of using force against Taiwan. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The division of China into separate governments is a great misfortune for all Chinese 
people. Many countries throughout history have experienced period of division and 
reunification. Recently, the typical example of reunification is that of West Germany and 
East Germany. However, the situation in the PRC and the ROC is quite different from the 
case of the former Germanies. German reunification demonstrated that divided countries can 
be reunified by economic and political integration. But in the case of the two sides of the 
Taiwan Strait, the ROC has almost no benefit to achieve unification quickly, because of the 
fact that Taiwanese have virtually nothing to gain through political integration. Although 
both sides have economic cooperation and exchanges, it seems that there are still some 
political obstacles to that cooperation. In the PRC, the concept of "one China" and "one 
country, two systems" is based on "absolute sovereignty." [Ref. 31, p. 73] In surveying the 
PRC's policy development and current strategies toward the ROC, the results demonstrate 
that Beijing has a biased understanding of the ROC's cross-Strait policies and that the PRC 's 
view of Taiwan as a local government of the PRC has alienated the people living in Taiwan. 
If both sides of the Taiwan Strait insist on their own positions at the expense of the 
other in the future, one would predict that the cross-Strait relationship will make no progress. 
On the other hand, if both sides readjust their positions toward each other, the cross-Strait 
relationship would be improved. This would be beneficial to both governments. In Chapter 
III and Chapter IV, the author pointed out that there are two things that are a consensus on 
both sides. The first is that both leaders agree that they could visit each other under proper 
conditions. The second is both governments agree that there is only one China and both 
governments desire unification. Based on such a consensus, both sides could take the 
following four ways to improve their future relationship. 
• Adopting a concept of "soft sovereignty" 
• Implementing more pragmatic consultations 
• Increasing exchanges 
• Creating mutual trust 
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A. ADOPTING A CONCEPT OF "SOFT SOVEREIGNTY" 
Both sides could adopt the concept of "soft sovereignty" rather than "absolute 
sovereignty." Since the 1990's, the traditional concept of "absolute sovereignty" has 
gradually changed in the modern world. The modern world is characterized by rapid 
circulation of capital, information, and values. The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 
1991, the separatist movements of various former Soviet republics, the racial war in 
Yugoslavia, and the recent war between Russia and Chechnya prove that the traditional 
theory of "absolute sovereignty" not only cannot solve the conflicts between "a political 
country" and "autonomy of racial groups," but has become a pretext for conflicts and 
massacres among different racial groups. The traditional theory of "absolute sovereignty" 
rules out any compromises between the state and racial groups. Its emphasis on absolute 
territorial integrity prevents the formation of a reciprocal formula of power maneuvering 
between the center and regional autonomy. It equates "national identity" with "citizenship" 
and is the major source of conflicts in the present world. [Ref. 14, p. 16] 
To the PRC, Beijing's "one China" principle specifies that there is only one China and 
that Beijing is the only central government of China. This position is an extension of the 
traditional theory of"absolute sovereignty". That is the reason Beijing insists on effecting 
national unification by turning Taipei into a local government, and why it refuses to 
renounce the use of force against Taiwan. To avoid military confrontation and accomplish 
national unification through a peaceful process, the ROC and the PRC should abandon the 
traditional concept of"absolute sovereignty" and build up on a "soft sovereignty" theory as 
the structure for their peaceful transition to national unification. A good example to use of 
the "soft sovereignty" is European Union. 
Under the MaastricherTreaty, through economic cooperation and market integration, 
each European nation gave up part of its sovereignty and set up the European Union. The 
basis for Europe's integration is a kind of "soft sovereignty" stressing commonalities and 
sharing. In the future, economic cooperation between the PRC and the ROC may also create 
the same condition for all the Chinese people. [Ref. 14, p. 17] 
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B. IMPLEMENTING MORE PRAGMATIC CONSULTATIONS 
Both sides need to implement more pragmatic consultations. After the first cross-Strait 
talks in Singapore in 1993, the two sides began to provide a consultation channel to deal with 
problems related to cross-Strait exchange. Although matters did not go smoothly at first 
because a consensus could not be easily achieved, the talks were headed in the right 
direction. As people-to-people exchanges have become more frequent, difference in systems 
and outlook on the two sides have inevitably given rise to a host of practical concerns. 
Therefore, as exchanges expand both sides could also seek to resolve these concerns through 
cross-Strait consultations. 
C. INCREASING EXCHANGES 
Both sides could increase exchanges. Despite the political divergence between the two 
sides, expanded cross-Strait exchanges such as business, cultural, educational, athletics, 
scientific and technological, religious and any kind of people-to-people level exchange could 
bring mutual benefit to both sides and intensify mutual understanding. Economically, both 
sides need to increase economic exchanges, thereby boosting the idea of parallel benefits in 
business, trade, and investment. The cross-Strait relationship should focus on trade and 
economic issues so that both sides might enjoy the benefits of a market economy. 
Additionally, both sides could relax their own restrictions on cross-Strait investment and 
trade to allow direct cross-Strait transportation of cargo. 
Politically, for the moment, the leaders of both sides agree to visit each other under 
suitable circumstances. This would be a good start for the political exchange. By a summit 
meeting between the leaders on the two sides, both might share their political experience and 
gain an insight into the political consensus of the other. 
D. CREATING MUTUAL TRUST 
The last and the most important way to better relations is the mutual trust. Currently, 
the Beijing leaders are still highly suspicious of separatist tendencies in Taiwan. They 
suspect that President Lee is an independence advocate at heart, despite Lee's assurance to 
the contrary. The PRC leadership worries about the pro-independence stance of the main 
opposition party, the DPP. If Beijing perceives that separatist forces are growing and that 
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Taiwan will gradually become a truly independent state, the PRC would probably not 
hesitate to use force against Taiwan. [Ref. 32, p. 20] In fact, one of the reason for increasing 
of support for the Taiwan independence movement is the PRC' s military threat. In order to 
gain the trust of the ROC's people, the PRC should renounce the option of using force 
against Taiwan. On the other hand, the author agrees with the suggestion of the former 
Premier of Singapore, Lee Gwanyao who recently stated that Taipei should temporarily 
retreat from the actions of re-entering the U.N. and claim that the ROC will not rely on 
foreign powers to become involved in the cross-Strait issues. [Ref. 33, p. 1] That may 
present the "good will" to the PRC to reduce the tension between the two sides of the Taiwan 
Strait. Only when the two sides build up a reserve of mutual trust and respect for each other 
can the future cross-Strait relations be improved. 
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